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Overview 
 
 
 
 
 
Lombok is one of the driest Indonesian islands. Its population is mainly concentrated 
in the South West plain where the capital city Mataram is located (see map) with 
around 400,000 inhabitants. In the dry season from March to October, few rains hit 
the plain and the regional public water supply company (PDAM) uses water 
catchments located at the bottom of the Rinjani volcano that plays a key role in 
regulating water flows. Yet, 50% of the springs dried up after the volcano’s hills faced 
deforestation at the end of the 1990s, and most stakeholders assumed that both facts 
were connected. 
 
Therefore a process was initiated in 2001 with the financial and technical support of 
international agencies (USAID, UNDP, Ford Foundation) to develop Payments for 
Environmental Services (PES) aimed at reforesting the volcano hills and adapting local 
practices. A first PES scheme was set up by local NGOs (Konsepsi, WWF-NT) in the 
mid-2000s. Then the district government took the lead and issued a district regulation 
on “environmental services management” in 2007, which paved the way for the 
second stage in the establishment of PES from 2009 onwards. A third PES scheme 
emerged in parallel after 2011 when the regional water supply company decided to 
go ahead with its own approach, probably because of perceived ineffectiveness. 
 
While the activities funded by the three schemes look similar in nature (watershed 
restoration and support to local communities), their institutional mechanisms are 
different. Money collection is either voluntary or mandatory, the legal frameworks 
differ, and the levels of funding are contrasted. The stakeholders holding power in all 
of these schemes also vary. 
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This study focuses on the 
complexity of PES scheme 
embedment in public policies.  
 
This factsheet describes and 
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PES initiatives, and explain the 
reasons for such an evolution 
in the design of policy 
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protecting groundwater 
resources. 
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Background 
The decision to set up a PES scheme was clearly influenced by the international 
community that was keen to make use of innovative environmental management 
instruments. The Lombok scheme illustrates one of the first attempts to apply PES. 
These used to be presented as direct incentive measures with conditionality between 
providers and beneficiaries, according to the logic of the Coase paradigm whereby both 
sides would find common interests and negotiate to achieve an optimal situation. Yet, in 
practice things look different, and Lombok illustrates this trend well with a multilayered 
scheme. The three layers are presented below. 
 
PES 1 – “voluntary payments” [1] 
The first scheme was implemented in 2005 by local NGOs in a pilot project logic, with the 
Bestari Community Fund established as intermediary between payers and beneficiaries, 
and was based on voluntary payments by water consumers downstream. It aimed at 
supporting local communities’ activities upstream for groundwater retention and 
filtration. An assessment of the willingness to pay for water consumers was thus done 
and yielded promising results; but money collection generated too high transaction 
costs. Hence a policy process was initiated for refinement with a different approach to 
money collection. 
 
PES 2 - “regulatory multistakeholder-governed scheme” 
A key outcome of this policy process was the promulgation of a regulation on 
“environmental services management” (Perda 4/2007) by the district parliament of West 
Lombok. This regulation creates the foundation for the second PES scheme in the same 
area as a substitute to the earlier one. A sophisticated multi-stakeholder agency (IMP) 
was created as intermediary and controller of the operations. This public body’s board 
includes representatives of the civil society (WWF-NT, Konsepsi, academia, etc.) but also 
public agencies. The regulation established a compulsory monthly tax added to the 
water bills paid by consumers (households, industries, tourist infrastructures), and a 
volume tax paid by water producers (public water supply, mineral water companies). Tax 
collection started in December 2009, and the funds are used since 2010 by the IMP to 
cover the expenses for afforestation and local empowerment activities proposed by 
farmer groups.  
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PES 3 - “internalised beneficiary-governed scheme” 
In order to enhance the impacts on the provision of water services – and because it is 
not represented at the IMP! – the regional public water supply company (PDAM) as main 
service beneficiary decided to implement its own PES scheme in 2011. It translates into 
bilateral agreements with farmers and takes place in parallel with the activities 
supported by IMP (PES 2).  
While the funded activities are very 
similar for both, the positioning of PDAM 
as leader in the PES 3 provides more 
guarantees that critical catchment areas 
are prioritised for their location. This third 
scheme is also innovative with regards to 
fees collection. It relies on the 
internalisation of the costs to maintain 
water services, which are invoiced to 
water consumers (see figure 1). Its scope 
of application is wider than PES 2 with 
three districts instead of one. 
[1] These are not the official names of the 
PES schemes described in this factsheet. The 
names are only intended to indicate the 
variety in the nature of the schemes. 
  
  
 
Contractual agreements and funding issues 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PES 1 – “voluntary payments” 
According to a willingness to pay study undertaken in Mataram city in 2004, 95% of 
consumers agreed to pay between IDR 1,000-5,000 every month (USD 10-50 cents) for 
springs’ protection. However, despite support from international donors, money collection 
remained very limited in practice and ambitions were thus restrained. Payments to farmer 
groups were designed as a development program more than as transactions for the 
provision of a given service. 
 
PES 2 - “regulatory multistakeholder-governed scheme” 
The main reason for establishing this new scheme was to upscale money collection (and 
reduce transaction costs) that moves from voluntary to compulsory owing to a district 
regulation. A small tax of IDR 1,000 (households, USD 10 cents) or IDR 2,000 (business, USD 
20 cents) is added to the monthly subscriptions of water consumers to PDAM, and the 
collected money is managed by the multi-stakeholder agency IMP. As the regulation is 
passed in the West Lombok district, only the 24,000 subscribers living there pay the tax… so 
that city water consumers do not contribute a penny! The regulation also set an additional 
IDR 10/m3 tax on commercial water production by PDAM, whose payment remains 
uncertain. 
 
This second PES relies on proposals drafted by local farmer groups and describing the 
planned activities and associated budget (information on the budget remained confidential). 
The proposals are submitted to the IMP and, if accepted, local groups and their members are 
supported with in-kind payments such as seedlings. Strikingly enough, conditions in the 
proposals do not address the provision of services once restoration has been performed. 
Farmers are free to manage their lands according to their own plans after funding is 
received, and this potentially includes logging the planted trees when mature. Legally, the 
proposals are more a requirement to receive a public subsidy, which is attributed by an 
administrative decision (unilateral), than a negotiated bilateral contract. 
 
Based on a political consensus 75% of collected funds were initially earmarked for PES field 
activities with the remaining 25% being attributed to the district budget to cover IMP’s 
operational costs. But recent changes led to these costs being covered also by the 75%, 
hence reducing the budget for field activities. This move shows lesser political will than 
expected in addressing the provision of water services with the PES. Despite a lack of publicly 
available data on money issues, we were told by IMP that IDR 100 million (USD 10,000) were 
spent yearly in the field, an amount expected to increase in 2013. Over the first two years, 10 
agreements materialised with local actors. 
 
PES 3 - “internalised beneficiary-governed scheme” 
The most recently created scheme leads to agreements that actually exhibit conditions. In 
particular, farmers must replace tree losses at their own costs: although payments are done 
before these conditions are actually verified, our interviews led to the conclusion that 
farmers understood that credibility was at stake. Transaction costs for the farmer groups are 
lower as the administrative burden was lightened: procedures are simpler and quicker for 
the negotiation of agreements, but also for the monitoring, reporting and verification stages. 
In addition payments to farmer groups are much higher for each group. Legally, the bilateral 
agreements are administrative contracts, a hybrid between a private transaction and a 
delegation of a public task. Field activities are very similar, i.e. restoration and reforestation 
efforts with little verification of achievements.  
 
This latest PES was launched in 2011 and finalised 10 contractual agreements in a single year 
for a total of IDR 600 million (USD 60,000). The bigger scale of this scheme comes from the 
wider scope of the money collection process. Indeed, the water company collects IDR 
1,000/month (USD 10 cents) from all of its 75,000 subscribers in order to internalise the costs 
of water services provision, i.e. PES activities on-the-ground. 
 
 
Policy process, economic rationale and effectiveness 
 
 
 
Embedment into public policies and political stakes 
Although the first scheme was initially planned as an application of the Coasean approach to 
environmental management, i.e. bilateral contracts outside of the state intervention, it 
appeared to be rapidly controlled by district authorities. The second PES, that we label 
“regulatory multistakeholder-governed scheme”, perfectly reflects the embedment of a 
private initiative into a public policy with associated regulations making compulsory the 
financial contributions by water consumers. This process led to the dismantlement of the 
previous voluntary scheme, yet with continued involvement of two of the originators 
(Konsepsi and WWF-NTB). The creation of the IMP was generally welcomed by stakeholders 
since it potentially gave voice to most of them. Yet in practice the new architecture also 
provided an opportunity for politicians and administrative bodies to serve their own goals. In 
this regard, it is worth noting that neither PDAM nor the provincial forest agency is 
represented at the IMP, probably for political reasons. 
 
The shift had positive (larger scale, interactions among stakeholders, mainstreaming of 
environmental issues into policy) and negative (lack of conditionality, limited environmental 
effectiveness, high transactions costs) implications. Although demonstrating the local 
political commitment towards the provision of environmental services, the district regulation 
(Perda 4/2007) also represented local power struggles and the temptation of embezzlement 
when public administrations take the lead. Furthermore, the late decision to allocate the 25% 
of the tax collection to the district budget instead of using it for operational costs shows how 
previous agreements can be denied because of local competition for power. It happens at the 
expense of tax payers and service providers, the available funds for sustainable land 
management are also reduced, and in the end the credibility of the political commitment also 
suffers. 
 
Limited additionality of the scheme 
The effectiveness of this second scheme remains undocumented as very few activities were 
implemented despite substantial money collection. Moreover, a proper monitoring of the 
activities is still lacking (no mapping, no follow-up once the trees are planted…). 
Observations in 2012 support a pessimist view on the concrete impacts on groundwater for 
several reasons. First, conditions associated to contracts are poor if not inexistent. Second, 
the district government (and its forest agency) de facto controls the IMP and its interests and 
goals were served in priority, such as the application of specific forest management (yet on 
small areas), the control of money spending and the capacity to maintain power over the 
provincial level. These goals leave little space to the provision of water services. Last, the 
activities are implemented without consideration of the hydrogeological reality. Although 
technical studies are required by another district regulation (Perda 2/2001) in order to 
delineate protection areas around the water catchments, they were never enforced. 
However the scheme adapts over time in response to local settings, and local actors can 
influence it. Its relevance is thus not disqualified in principle, and IMP board members have 
the possibility to improve its implementation in the future. For instance, NGOs or service 
beneficiaries might push for a better spatial targeting of field activities, for more conditions 
prior to payments and for enhanced monitoring of the outcomes. 
 
Reaction of PDAM: de-embedment 
In reaction to these shortcomings, the PDAM as main single beneficiary of watershed services 
established recently its own PES. The funding comes directly from internalization in the water 
bills of the production costs related to the protection of springs. Interestingly, this funding is 
in line with national water regulations (law on water resource 7/2004, government 
regulations 16/2005 on water supply development and 23/2006 on water tariffs) as opposed 
to the district regulation imposing a tax that was eventually assessed as conflicting with the 
national fiscal regulation! While the first reason that comes to mind for the emergence of this 
parallel initiative is the low efficiency of the previous PES, data also shows that PDAM has a 
political agenda. Creating its own PES on Coasean (hence bilateral) grounds is a way to be 
seen as a generous contributor instead of a tax collector. Unstated competition was also 
observed between IMP and PDAM institutions: they exhibit little mutual support although 
both schemes should be complementary with their own strengths and limitations. 
The PES initiatives in Lombok are 
interesting for their evolution from 
short-lasting and voluntary (for 
payers and beneficiaries) to 
mandatory on the beneficiary side.  
 
While there is a consensus on the 
need to secure funding with 
coercive means, the search for 
effectiveness and local power 
struggles triggered the 
establishment of two distinct 
schemes. Indeed, taxes were first 
set up before the water distribution 
company decided to internalize the 
costs of service provision.  
 
Everything looks like the private 
interests of the water company as 
beneficiary (sustained water 
supplies) found their way amidst 
public interests for local 
development (PES 2). At the same 
time, the Lombok case illustrates 
perfectly the opportunities and risks 
to rely on regulation and a certain 
level of embedment into public 
policies: awareness raising and 
substantial funding, but 
dependence on political agendas. 
 
Challenges 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The main challenge for the evolving PES attempts in Lombok, that reached so far three 
different stages, is to ensure that impacts materialize soon with more reforestation, 
less forest degradation, and in the end an improved provision of water services. 
Indeed, the funding involved is substantial relatively to the small scale of the area of 
implementation, and for a developing country (respectively USD 10,000 and USD 
60,000 a year for PES 2&3). Local farmers assert positive impacts on springs due to 
restoration and conservation activities, but positive effects on water catchments still 
are to be assessed. Improved targeting is required based on future hydrogeological 
studies, and additionality is not guaranteed so far. The willingness of PDAM to engage 
in bilateral contracts with deeper negotiations might help to make progress, but our 
observations were not conclusive yet in this regard. Contracts in all Lombok PES 
schemes fail to effectively address the causes of a decline in water services, and much 
progress can be done with conditions and monitoring. 
 
Another challenge is political. It is certainly good that water became a prominent 
political issue, both for drinking water and agriculture irrigation (note that farmers do 
not contribute to funding when using irrigation techniques, which is a sensitive political 
issue and introduces a controversial “pay the polluter” element if they receive PES 
payments). Local NGOs can now point to the weaknesses of the schemes and propose 
fine-tuning or more dramatic changes, and they will have to find a balance between 
public debates and backstage lobbying to this aim. The board of IMP where they have a 
seat provides one promising way to promote their ideas. Competition between the 
various schemes can be healthy  and lead to positive outcomes if their promoters try to 
justify their maintenance with real improvements, but it can also lead to a waste of 
financial resources if they do not coordinate more in the future. Ironically, the public 
status of PDAM did not obviously facilitate such coordination so far because of local 
power struggles. 
 
A third challenge is legal. The tax collected in addition to water bills, as it is aimed at 
maintaining water services, eventually covers the costs of water production. As such, 
these monthly fees can be viewed as redundant (thus undue) financial contributions 
because water bills are supposed to also contribute to this objective. This issue was 
pointed out by a commission of the national Financial Supervisory Board that declared 
the tax illegal, while recognizing the relevance of related activities. The ministry of 
environment is now trying to fix this problem, but PDAM has admittedly found a 
solution with its internalization approach that dramatically differs from a tax (at least in 
legal terms and visibility for contributors). Thus the third and most recent PES relies on 
a stronger legal basis and faces fewer legal issues than the public intervention. Indeed, 
it takes advantage of a clear statement in national water regulations that water supply 
companies are responsible for water management, including protection of the 
recharging areas. Costs incurred for this protection are thus part of their operational 
costs from an accounting perspective. 
 
What does this tell us? The extent and nature of the embedment of the scheme into 
public policies is central, and PES initiatives can certainly not be envisaged as 
transactions taking place in a vacuum. Rather, they constitute specific modes of 
governance that interact with many others and also with related institutions and legal 
provisions. Concretely, in the case of West Lombok, if the district regulation on water 
catchment protection (Perda 2/2001) were to be implemented and enforced in the first 
place – with associated protection of strategic locations – then the need for these 
various PES would be limited. The latter actually fill the gap, maybe temporarily, 
between laws and their enforcement. Altogether, they also demonstrate the 
institutional ingenuity of the local actors when they face obstacles, as illustrated by the 
variety of design in all three PES. 
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An important opportunity is the legal solution used by PDAM with the third PES. While the 
Ministry of the environment and forest administrations keep discussing a way to spread the 
second PES, PDAM remains firm on its feet. It circumvents the policy bargaining and likely 
financial capture by intermediaries, and continues to rely on the national water regulations. 
These allow any regional public water supply company in Indonesia to collect money, in 
their operational cost structure, to support the protection and restoration of their 
catchment’ recharging area. This solution could be used today all over Indonesia to access 
financial resources through the monthly water bills for the provision of environmental 
services, all the more as financial contributions from individuals are very low (the price of 
one cigarette in Lombok) and might lead to reduced bills in the longer term when 
environmental services are secured. This might be innovative in Indonesia, but similar 
requirements are applied in other countries already. Researchers are encouraged  to take a 
closer look at the regulations addressing natural resources for specific environmental 
services (here water regulations) to solve the legal and administrative problem of many PES 
schemes. 
 
In Lombok, it would also be possible to observe the merits of PES from the perspective of 
payers’ acceptance. The creation of a new tax faced reluctance in a country where public 
financial resources are suspected to be misallocated. The establishment of the IMP, where 
civil society is also represented, gave better guarantees that collected funds would be spent 
according to the initial statements. By stipulating that 75% of the money would be spent on 
contracts with farmers, the regional authorities could enhance local acceptance.  
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